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At present rates of growth, certain 
rapidly developing countries like 
China, India, and Brazil could over-
take today’s industrial states in 40 
years. Developing countries are be-
coming correspondingly more asser-
tive in international trade negotia-
tions, and are dominating their re-
gions economically and politically.
The times when the developing 
countries were passive objects in glob-
al trade talks are long gone. As early 
as the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade they began to demand, if softly, 
that the developed world fulfill its 
promise to open markets to farm and 
textile imports. At the Doha Ministe-
rial Conference of the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 they would have 
blocked the start of the next round of 
trade talks if they had not won some 
concessions in these sectors. Accord-
ingly development issues like capacity 
building, were put on the agenda for 
the first time in Doha. In addition, 
against strong opposition from the 
United States and Switzerland in par-
ticular, they won the right to produce 
drugs under compulsory licensing 
agreements and to import cheap ge-
neric drugs from third-party countries 
through “parallel imports,” despite 
existing patent protection.
By 2003, twenty developing coun-
tries formed the G20 to counterbal-
ance the industrialized nations and 
coordinate their own positions in the 
run-up to the WTO Ministerial Con-
ference in Cancún, Mexico. This birth 
represented “the rise of a new geogra-
phy in international trade,” as the 
former Secretary-General of the Unit-
ed Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Rubens Ricupero, put 
it. Brazil, India, and China are the gi-
ants of the G20 and constitute, with 
Russia, the “BRIC” bloc. No less a fi-
nancial judge than the Goldman Sachs 
investment bank concluded in its 
2003 report “Dreaming with BRICs: 
The Path to 2050” that the economies 
of the BRICs (whose combined pro-
duction today still falls under 15 per-
cent of the G6 economies of the Unit-
ed States, Japan, Germany, Britain, 
France, and Italy) could surpass the 
G6 in less than 40 years, leaving only 
the US and Japan among the globe’s 
six largest economies.
In the end the Cancún talks broke 
up mainly over a North-South clash 
on the fundamental issues of market 
access in agricultural trade, the G20’s 
maximalist demand for abolition of 
all trade-distorting subsidies, and the 
US and European Union’s refusal to 
yield on these issues. By mid-2004, 
however, the US, EU, Australia, and 
Brazil and India as G20 representa-
tives managed to work out a basis for 
a broad WTO framework agreement 
to allow trade talks to go ahead.
By last February representatives 
from Brazil, China, India, and South 
Africa were also invited to the sum-
mit of G7 ministers of finance–and 
this inclusion even led to speculation 
that the G7 might be enlarged.
At a regional level, the BRIC states 
are key political and economic actors, 
the so called “anchor states.” They are 
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Global ambitions–regional responsibility
by Claudia Decker and Stormy Mildner
Brazil, India, and China (nicknamed, along with Russia, the “BRICs”) 
are the new, fast-growing regional economic giants. And they know it.
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the locomotives in their own areas, 
but they can also drag others down in 
stagnation and cross-national eco-
nomic instability. In South America, 
for example, Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) negotiations are 
currently marking time because Bra-
zil, which is co-chair with the US, is 
not willing to continue without basic 
concessions by Washington in the ag-
ricultural sector. Brazil is now focus-
ing instead on the Mercosur group, in 
which it is associated with Argentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay. Brazil hopes 
to bring the Andean region and the 
Central American states into Merco-
sur, and later to reach trade agree-
ments with India and China, which is 
by now Brazil’s third most important 
trading partner. Yet, here too the ne-
gotiations on deepening regional inte-
gration are slow, as Brazil repeatedly 
reverts to protectionist measures to 
coddle its own domestic industry and 
thus does not fulfill the role expected 
of a leading regional power.
For its part, China is gaining political 
and economic influence in Asia. This 
can be seen in its prominent role in 
Southeast Asian economic agreements. 
As discontent with the domineering 
manner of the US and interest in the 
Chinese market have both grown, 
Southeast Asian countries have begun 
reorienting themselves toward China. 
Last November China signed a trade 
agreement with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
which wants to implement a free trade 
area by the year 2010. With a popula-
tion of two billion, this would be the 
biggest free-trade area in the world. 
Even today China and the ASEAN 
states have strong economic links; dur-
ing the first nine months of 2004 China-
ASEAN trade increased 35 percent. If 
this dynamic continues, China will 
soon replace the US as ASEAN’s most 
important trading partner. India too, 
which is emerging gradually from its 
self-imposed isolation, claims a stronger 
regional role and also aims to conclude 
a free trade zone with ASEAN–in part, 
as a counterweight to China.
Soft Power over Military Might
The growing power of the developing 
countries clearly comes from no over-
whelming Weberian military clout. 
Modern power is exerted through the 
control and governance of internation-
al structures and institutions. Espe-
cially in the WTO what is far more 
important is Joseph Nye’s “soft power” 
or Susan Strange’s “structural power”–
the ability to change existing structures 
to one’s own advantage. At their core, 
the instruments of such power tend to 
be economic and cultural–and include 
the market power of the private sector. 
The economic size of a country, the 
competitiveness of exports, the attrac-
tiveness of a domestic market for for-
eign producers and exporters, and a 
technological edge are all typical ele-
ments of structural power.
In this respect those developing and 
emerging countries that have not re-
jected globalization have benefited 
greatly from it and gained political 
influence. Many of these so-called 
globalizing countries have thereby 
learned from the failures of earlier 
development strategies of import sub-
stitution, subsidizing of infant indus-
tries, and the debt crisis of the 1980s–
as well as from the positive examples 
of some Asian countries with export-
oriented economies like Malaysia, 
South Korea, and Thailand. They 
have liberalized their markets and 
implemented economic and political 
reforms. The globalizing developing 
countries that chose this route reached 
an average growth rate of 3.5 percent 
in the 1980s and 5 percent in the 
1990s, along with a significant reduc-
tion of poverty. Between 1981 and 
In the WTO what is 
important is “soft 
power” or “struc-
tural power”–the 
ability to change 
existing structures 
to one’s own 
advantage. In this 
respect those 
developing coun-
tries that have not 
rejected globaliza-
tion have benefited 
greatly from it.
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2001 the percentage of people living 
on one dollar a day dropped from 40 
percent to 21 percent. In that period 
fast economic growth in East and 
Southeast Asia helped more than 500 
million people escape poverty. In 
China alone the number of those liv-
ing in poverty dropped from 600 mil-
lion to 200 million. In India, since 
2000, urban poverty has fallen 24 per-
cent, rural poverty 30 percent.
By contrast, non-globalizing coun-
tries that still seal off world markets 
have experienced a relatively low 
growth rate, with an average of 0.8 
percent and 1.4 percent in the 1980s 
and 1990s respectively. In sub-Saharan 
Africa per capita income shrank by 15 
percent between 1981 and 2001.
China
A look at the three developing giants 
illustrates the dynamic. With a mar-
ket of 1.3 billion consumers and an 
enormous pool of inexpensive labor, 
China will change today’s global in-
vestments and trade flows. Over the 
past quarter century China has grown 
by a striking 9 percent per annum. If 
this rate continues, the Goldman 
Sachs report expects China to pass 
stagnant Germany in the next four 
years–and the US in 2041.
Such growth is generated primarily 
by Beijing’s explosive trade. From 
2000 to 2002 trade accounted for 
more than 50 percent of GDP; in 
2003 alone total exports grew by 23 
percent, while imports rose 31 per-
cent, to make China the sixth-largest 
national economy, with a GDP of 
$1.4 trillion and the fourth-largest 
trading nation, with exports of about 
$342 billion. In 2003 investments of 
some $54 billion flowed into China. 
By now Beijing holds the second-larg-
est currency reserves worldwide, at 
$600 billion.
China is a market with great poten-
tial–including, of course, risk poten-
tial. In spite of swift economic growth, 
China is still a developing country, 
with an average per capita income of 
no more than $1000. And China’s 
transition to a free-market economy is 
still incomplete. China’s accession to 
the WTO at the end of 2003 has con-
firmed its commitment to free-market 
principles, but the way from a closed 
to an open market economy and from 
a conspicuously rural society to an 
industrial and service society remains 
long and arduous. Planned reforms 
include another restructuring of the 
170,000 state-owned enterprises, 
which accounted for half of the coun-
try’s industrial output in 2002. Also 
on the agenda is a restructuring of the 
banking sector; today bad loans con-
stitute more than 25 percent of the 
whole asset portfolio. Furthermore, 
China’s exchange-rate policy must be 
revised. By pegging the yuan to the 
dollar, the Chinese government delib-
erately stimulates domestic growth–
but in the long run this could lead to 
overheating. By accelerating global 
competition and increasing resent-
ment of Chinese imports–particularly 
in the US–the undervaluation of the 
yuan invites international irritation.
China’s big challenge is thus to 
find some way to close the gap be-
tween economic reforms and slug-
gish political modernization, while 
avoiding social unrest from the high 
costs of adjustment. The gap be-
tween the relatively rich eastern 
provinces and the poor western prov-
inces with their sluggish growth, 
continuously rising unemployment, 
and economic decline, aggravates 
China’s social problems.
In India, growth averaged 6 percent 
annually from 1992 to 2002 and after a 
favorable monsoon in 2003 rose 8 per-
cent to a GDP of $599 billion. In the 
fourth quarter of 2003 India’s growth 
With a market of 1.3 
billion consumers 
and a huge pool of 
inexpensive labor, 
China will change 
today’s global 
investments and 
trade flows. Over 
the past quarter 
century China has 
grown by a striking 
9% per annum. If 
this rate continues, 
Goldman Sachs 
reports expect 
China to pass stag-
nant Germany in 
the next four years–
 and the US in 2041.
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of some 10.4 percent even surpassed 
China’s for the first time, and India 
should grow faster than China over the 
next 15 years, according to Deutsche 
Bank Research projections. Over the 
next 50 years India’s economy is ex-
pected to expand at an average 5.5 
percent, well above the performance of 
either China or Brazil. This pace would 
double GDP over the next 13 years and 
make India the world’s third-largest 
national economy after the US and 
China by 2020. More than half of the 
Indian population is younger than 25 
years, and India is the only one of the 
emerging giants whose labor force will 
grow over the next half century.
Statistically, India is still a rural 
country, with agriculture producing a 
quarter of GDP. The industrial and 
tertiary sectors are becoming more 
important, however. Today manufac-
turing accounts for 27 percent of GDP, 
the service sector for more than 50 
percent. Manufacturing–including in-
formation technologies and pharma-
ceutical products–is competitive glob-
ally. Indian research, primarily in such 
areas as space travel and biotechnolo-
gy, has advanced to world class.
Some caution is in order, of course. 
Like China, India faces a series of 
challenges. India is still a closed na-
tional economy, in which exports of 
goods and services amount to only 15 
percent of GDP. Exports increased by 
some 12 percent annually from 1995, 
to 2003, but India is still only the 
31st-largest exporter of goods world-
wide and only the 21st-largest ex-
porter of services. Although 17 per-
cent of the world’s population lives in 
India, the country produces only 1 
percent of international trade and less 
than 2 percent of global GDP. In addi-
tion, India continues to isolate itself 
from the world economy by high cus-
toms duties. The average Indian tariff 
is 29 percent, with the average tariff 
for non-agricultural products running 
to some 28 percent and for agricul-
tural products to some 37 percent. At 
the same time, India initiated the 
most anti-dumping cases in the WTO 
between 1995 and 2003.
With a per capita income of about 
$454 in 2003, India is still a developing 
country, lagging behind China by 10 to 
15 years. A fourth of the Indian popu-
lation still lives under the absolute 
poverty line of less than one dollar per 
day. About 9 million people enter the 
job market every year. To provide them 
with workplaces, India needs a growth 
rate of about 8 percent. Furthermore, 
feeble domestic demand and the ab-
sence of internal and external invest-
ments is a serious problem. Invest-
ments are especially needed for infra-
structure, most crucially in community 
health and education in rural areas.
Brazil
The third of the trio of emerging gi-
ants, Brazil, is also a power regionally 
and globally. It is the world’s biggest 
producer of orange juice, the third-
biggest exporter of sugar, and it has 
the tenth-largest economy. But more 
than a third of its 190 million live 
below the poverty line, the unemploy-
ment rate is over 10 percent, and in-
come is unequally distributed.
In 2004 Brazil recovered from the 
slump of the preceding years. GDP 
grew by 4.6 percent, the highest rate 
in a decade. Exports, investments, and 
domestic demand all increased palpa-
bly. Agriculture is still one of the most 
dynamic sectors; in 2003 it generated 
42 percent of Brazilian exports. Today 
the sector contributes 10 percent of 
GDP, along with 40 percent of Brazil-
ian jobs. It is growing fast; in the past 
three years acreage has increased 15 
percent, while harvests have increased 
by almost 50 percent. Brazil is thus 
keenly interested in opening up farm 
In the fourth quar-
ter of 2003 India’s 
growth of some 
10.4% even sur-
passed China’s for 
the first time, and 
India should grow 
faster than China 
over the next 15 
years. Over the 
next 50 years its 
economy is expect-
ed to expand at an 
average 5.5%, well 
above the perfor-
mance of either 
China or Brazil.
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commodity markets. Additionally, 
Brazil is rich in resources. It has the 
most iron ore of any country in the 
world, and because of its low labor 
costs it is also the world’s cheapest 
producer of steel for the increasing 
demand in China and elsewhere.
 Brazil too, however, faces huge 
risks. Its high $250 billion debt equals 
56 percent of GDP. Other problems are 
excessive bureaucracy, widespread cor-
ruption, and the falling competitive-
ness of many branches. Brazil’s infra-
structure urgently needs upgrading; 
transport costs are double those in 
Russia or China. Besides, the Brazilian 
economy is not as open as that in other 
emerging giants. Investments from 
abroad in 2004 equalled only 2 percent 
of GDP. Brazil ranks only 25th among 
world exporters and only 35th in ex-
port of services. Brazil’s high tariffs 
stand at 12 percent for agricultural and 
14 percent for non-agricultural goods.
In recent years President Lula da 
Silva has initiated a macroeconomic 
stabilization program of strict mone-
tary and budgetary policy and decel-
eration of inflation and accumulated 
debt. If this strategy of reforms con-
tinues, Brazil’s GDP could grow 3.6 
percent over the next 50 years, over-
taking Great Britain and Germany by 
2036 on its way to becoming the 
world fifth-largest economy, after 
China, the US, India, and Japan.
Given their economic, demographic 
and geographic size, all the BRICs–
along with other regional “anchor 
states” like Indonesia, South Africa, 
and Turkey–are indispensable part-
ners for solving current global prob-
lems. Their ascent in becoming politi-
cal and economic world powers implies 
a corollary acceptance of responsibility 
to reform themselves and to help pull 
others in their regions out of poverty.
Domestically, internal reforms are 
urgently needed in all these countries, 
not only to ensure macroeconomic 
stability, good governance, rule of law, 
transparency and an end to parasitic 
corruption, but also to enable them to 
play a constructive role internation-
ally. Effective and transparent fiscal 
systems are essential to allow greater 
opening of markets and reduce reli-
ance on tariffs as a primary source of 
revenues. Regionally, the new eco-
nomic powers should become anchor 
states in a positive sense, helping to 
draw weak neighbors out of penury. 
At this stage it is important for them 
to open their own markets to agricul-
ture and textile imports from the 
least–developed countries. 
One such South-South cooperation 
program is the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
launched in 2001 by the Organization 
of African Unity (now called the Af-
rican Union) to promote mutual help 
in development, good governance, 
and reforms in countries with similar 
interests and structural problems. 
India, Brazil, and South Africa too 
are pioneering South-South coopera-
tion. Making their own donations and 
best practices available to others, they 
have recently started an International 
Banking Security Association (IBSA) 
Fund under the UN Development Pro-
gram to finance small-scale projects in 
the least-developed countries. 
Finally, the developing counties 
that are now surging ahead must not 
pull back and limit their roles in in-
ternational organizations only to 
blocking proposals they do not like. 
They also need to facilitate negotia-
tions actively–including by making 
concessions. The BRICs will not 
learn this new role overnight; they 
will have to grow slowly into their 
new political position. In this they 
must be actively supported by indus-
trial countries, both technologically 
and financially.
Brazil too faces 
huge risks. Its high 
$250bn debt equals 
56% of GDP. Other 
problems are 
excessive bureau-
cracy, widespread 
corruption, and the 
falling competitive-
ness of  many 
branches. Brazil’s 
infrastructure 
urgently needs 
upgrading; trans-
port costs are 
double those in 
Russia or China. 
Besides, the Brazil-
ian economy is not 
as open as that in 
other emerging 
giants.
